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What Archie Cochrane Learnt from a Single Case in 1943 (1989)  
The eighteenth-century physician Marcus Herz held that case reports were the means by 
which doctors ‘write experience into the world’. (1) In broad terms they record how the 
diverse phenomena of illness are made sense of medically and which treatments are tried. But 
the search for explanations can prove elusive and case reports instead may revolve around 
clinical uncertainty and irresolution. (2)  Although today’s reports often follow standard 
approaches to medical problems some feature novel situations that may confound readerly 
expectations. Archie Cochrane’a account of a dying man at Elsterhorst, a German prisoner of 
war camp, first appeared in his memoir, published posthumously in 1989, and has since 
entered the medical literature: (3)   
 “The Germans dumped a young Soviet prisoner in my ward late one night. The ward was 
full, so I put him in my room as he was moribund and screaming as I did not want to wake 
the ward. I examined him. He had obvious gross bilateral cavitation and a severe pleural 
rub. I thought the latter was the cause of the pain and the screaming. I had no morphia, 
just aspirin, which had no effect. I felt desperate. I knew very little Russian then and there 
was no one in the ward who did. I finally instinctively sat down on the bed and took him in 
my arms, and the screaming stopped almost at once. He died peacefully in my arms a few 
hours later. It was not the pleurisy that caused the screaming but loneliness. It was a 
wonderful education about the care of the dying. I was ashamed of my misdiagnosis and 
kept the story secret.” (4) 
This recollection, pungently told, recounts a specific turn of events which took place in 1943 
in a large camp in Saxony, where Cochrane was the sole medical officer. The clinical scenario 
– “moribund and screaming” and “gross bilateral cavitation and a severe pleural rub” – is 
initially taken to support a causal claim: that the soldier’s distress was due to pain, pain caused 
by tuberculous pleurisy and lung disease for which Cochrane could offer no treatment. But as 
the case unfolds the facticity of this causal chain is thrown into doubt if not fully retracted, 
and a quite different claim is made: that it was loneliness (not pain) that was the cause of the 
man’s distress.  The evidence which led Cochrane to this switch in explanatory account 
became apparent only when he took the soldier in his arms: “almost at once” (he tells us) the 
screaming stopped, suggesting the embrace transformed  the soldier’s mental and emotional 
world and enabled him to feel calmer and pass away peacefully.  
Cochrane's felt experiences are especially noteworthy because these particular aspects of 
medical care are often muted in modern case reports. But here they emerge openly, nested 
in a memoir of the doctor-narrator’s life, in which he recounts his fortunate circumstances of 
birth and education, how he became a prisoner of war and later a physician-scientist teeming 
with ideas, questions, activism and agency, a professor of tuberculosis and chest diseases at 
the Welsh National School of Medicine, and later director of the Medical Research Council’s 
epidemiology research unit in Cardiff. (4)  
In his account of the soldier’s dying hours Cochrane is fully present, thinking, caring, 
resourceful and unorthodox: “I put him in my room as he was moribund and screaming as I 
did not want to wake the ward. I examined him. … I had no morphia… . I felt desperate. I knew 
very little Russian then… . I finally instinctively sat down on the bed and took him in my arms… 
. I was ashamed of my misdiagnosis and kept the story secret.” Through his thoughts and 
feelings we sense his sense of urgency and something too of his resourcefulness and capacity 
to manoeuver despite the lack of medical means.  
Thoughts, feelings and motives saturate clinical practice, but case reports tend to subordinate 
these aspects of the hurly burly of clinical experience to the goal of setting out findings, 
hypotheses and knowledge claims; and the responsivity and impulsivity which Cochrane 
showed in 1943 are often edited out; and if they do creep in it is more likely to be wonder, 
awe and astonishment that become apparent in response to clinical appearances than the raw 
shame, desperation and tenderness that we see here. Perhaps publishing this case outside the 
confines of a specialist field of knowledge, undisciplined by its editorial and peer review 
practices, allowed Cochrane the space he needed to recall and resolve what had taken place 
between himself and the dying soldier. The traces which deceased patients leave in medical 
thoughts and practices (5) and the “work of remembering and the time spent ordering, and 
living through memories ... [of] those who have died” has been conceptualised by Arthur 
Kleinman as “a continuation of the caregiving … provided when they lived”. (6) 
A striking aspect of Cochrane’s account is its didactic closing statement which makes a large 
yet enigmatic claim that “[i]t was a wonderful education about the care of the dying.” Which 
aspects of this man’s case did Cochrane find so educative? Had he extracted a useful general 
lesson from the singularity of these terrible circumstances such as: that doctors would do well 
not to assume screaming is a response to somatic pain even when - as in these circumstances 
- the patient is suffering from a condition many people find very painful? Could he have 
concluded that when clinicians cannot communicate verbally the anxiety and loneliness 
patients feel can much too easily be imputed to pain, and that all three states – pain, anxiety 
and loneliness - are eased by human reassurance, reassurance engendered through physical 
closeness? Did Cochrane conclude that the dramatic alteration in the man’s mental and 
behavioural state meant he had not been in severe pain in the first place? Cochrane was 
clearly impressed by how completely the process of dying in this soldier’s case was eased as a 
result of interpersonal recognition founded on human closeness, on ‘being with’ (7) at the end 
of life. Was the main lesson for Cochrane that instinctive responses - which here took the form 
of a long embrace, a communing bodily contact lasting hours - have a place in clinical practice?    
The confessional quality of Cochrane’s account is evident and goes beyond accepting 
responsibility for a delay in diagnosis. Cochrane referred (perhaps too severely) to having 
misdiagnosed the man about whom he felt ashamed, which may have led him to suppress 
that occasion in 1943. In 1945 he published a paper in the BMJ which reflectively and 
rigorously set out his experiences as the only doctor responsible for the medical care of 
thousands of prisoners of war, many of whom had tuberculosis and were severely 
malnourished (8), which made no reference to the death of the Soviet soldier. The appearance 
of the case 45 years later suggests Cochrane continued to ponder its meaning and significance, 
recalling that “the… event … had a marked effect on me”. (4) The memoir provided him the 
opportunity to offer homage to the soldier, a form of reparation for his suffering, and 
Cochrane may have hoped publication would release him from the shame he appears to have 
harbored about the case.  
But what was it that Cochrane felt ashamed about? Was it the “misdiagnosis”? Was it the fact 
that he had achieved the correct diagnosis not by a process of reasoning or by a recognized 
clinical method, but through a sense of his own desperation, which led him to his instinctive 
gesture towards the soldier; was his shame engendered by what Cochrane thought had been 
a misreading of another person's agony? Was it the sheer serendipity of his clinical epiphany 
that affronted this physician-scientist in the making? Or did Cochrane feel discomfort at the 
prospect of admitting that instinct and impulse had driven him into the arms of a patient - to 
a bodily closeness - at a time when this could have been interpreted as improper and a breach 
of professional etiquette and ethics? 
We cannot be sure what the answers to these questions are, but their plurality alerts us to 
how much can be at stake in written accounts of clinical cases, how relationally and 
epistemologically entwined case reports can turn out to be, and how much of what they 
recount may be left unresolved. As Arthur Frank has shown, there is much more involved in 
the experience of illness than the medically told account of it. (9) In his own illness memoir 
Frank writes of the commotion facing caregivers who are “confronted not with an ordered 
sequence of illness experiences, but with a stew of panic, uncertainty, fear, denial, and 
disorientation.” (10)  
Cochrane’s case has entered the medical literature as a spur to better pain relief in palliative 
care, (2) but it is more than this: because it brings to the fore uncertainties, ambiguities and 
unexpected occurrences that can unfold in clinical work which give rise to feelings that are 
often muffled in official accounts. Case reports today offer accounts of clinical situations that 
feature dominant ostensive descriptions of what happened. But Cochrane’s case provides a 
story containing another message resonant of human relationships: it asserts that some cases 
go beyond specific, scientific claims or counterclaims, paths not taken, riddles unriddled, and 
elegant solutions. His is an act of memory and reconstruction, an account of a dying soldier 
undertaken without the benefit of clinical notes, by someone unusually meticulous and 
rigorous in defining and thinking about medical problems. We have no reason to think it is not 
an accurate, textual embodiment - an expressive imprint - of what happened and how it 
happened, which sets out the findings, thoughts, instinctive reactions, imperfect 
understanding and the partial state of knowledge of a clinician caught unawares in 
circumstances of war. It can be read as a memorial text, as an act of reparation, an attempt at 
gaining some release from self-criticism, and as a small contribution to ethical witnessing and 
the cultural memory of suffering, recounted by a man whose subsequent professional 
achievements inspired critical scepticism towards the value of case reports. Cochrane’s case 
records an act of brotherhood to another person. Not medical just human.  
1. Leder, C M. Die Grenzgänge des Marcus Herz: Beruf, Haltung and Identität eines 
jüdischen Arztes gegen Ende des 18. Jahrunderts. Münster: Waxmann, 2007, 51-52, 
cited in Class, M. Introduction: medical case histories as genre: new approaches. 
Literature and Medicine 2014; 32(1): vii-xvi.  DOI: 10.1353/lm.2014.0007 
2. Hurwitz, B. Form and representation in clinical case reports. Literature and Medicine 
2006; 25:216-40. 
3. Wiffen, P. The Cochrane collaboration: pain, palliative and supportive care. Palliative 
Medicine 2003; 17: 75-77.  
4. Cochrane, A.L. (with M. Blythe) One man’s medicine. London: British Medical Journal 
(Memoir Club) 1989:82. 
5. Hurwitz, B. Dead notes: a meditation and an investigation in general practice. Lancet 
1998; 351: 593-4. 
6. Kleinman, A. Caring for memories. Lancet 2016; 387:2596-7. 
  
7. Wirth M, Hurwitz B. Awareness and Dying: The Problem of Sedating ‘Existential 
Suffering’ in Palliative Care. Ethical Perspectives 2016; 23(2): 307-326. 
8. Cochrane, A.L. Tuberculosis among prisoners of war in Germany. BMJ 1945; 2: 655-7.  
9. Frank, A. The wounded storyteller. Chicago: University of Chicago Press 1995.  
10. Frank, A.  At the Will of the Body. New York: Houghton Mifflin, 1991, 49. 
 
 
